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In many European societies, the reform of the pension system has recently proven 
highly problematic and controversial (Hemerijck and Ferrera, forthcoming).  The 
European Union (EU) has entered this policy area both indirectly – via instruments 
concerned to ensure fiscal stability – and directly – in the context of attempts at 
coordinating ‘structural reform’ with a view to reforming the European economy.  
Thus, in principle, a stimulus of ‘Europeanization’ exists for pension reform.  EU 
obligations can be cited as warranting a shift of domestic policy interests (fiscal 
discipline; peer credibility on structural reform) and policy ideas (shared learning and 
policy transfer).  For member states endeavouring to enter the single currency ‘euro-
zone’ and to abide by its strictures, but suffering long-term problems of high public 
deficits, the budget stimulus to pension reform is clear.  Moreover, these same 
member states in particular have a clear interest in being seen to be convergent with 
the EU’s  ‘core’ states, displaying affinities of policy perspective and compliance with 
the Union’s priority goals, such as those of structural reform. 
 This paper argues, however, that the EU stimuli are in fact limited in their 
nature and that entrenched institutional obstacles in domestic systems can readily 
thwart their potency. The paper focuses on a case study – Greece – to show how the 
will and capability for pension reform can be overcome by a domestic gridlock of 
power and interests.  Admittedly, the Greek case in these terms is an exceptional one. 
In doing so, the paper seeks to contribute to debates concerning: 
 
• The challenges for the EU in coordinating a process of structural 
reform – seen as important both in terms of its international 
competitiveness and the increased heterogeneity resulting from 
enlargement. 
• The conceptualisation of the public policy process in Greece, relevant 
to the project of ‘modernization’ advanced by Premier Costas Simitis. 
                                                 
* I am very grateful to Dimitris Papadimitriou (Manchester) and Waltraud Schelkle (LSE) for their 
comments on an earlier draft.  Any errors remain mine alone. 
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The focus of the paper is domestic: why has the record of reform been so modest, 
given both EU and national stimuli to act?  The argument is that the reform initiative 
has been repeatedly thwarted by the severe institutional constraints operating in 
Greece.  The external stimulus from the EU has changed and is currently too weak. 
The empowerment offered by the EU is limited in nature: it lacks precision; sufficient 
temporal discipline; and the costs of non-compliance are too low.  By contrast, the 
domestic impediments to reform are very strong: the commitment to reform is 
ambiguous, agency capability is weak, conflicting interests create seemingly 
insurmountable veto-points, the relevance of technocratic legitimisation is limited, 
and the social partners exhibit low levels of trust in each other. 
  
 The paper is structured in four main parts.  Section 1 identifies the nature of 
the policy problem and the stimuli to reform.  Section 2 examines the interests and 
strategies of the key domestic actors involved in the reform process and places them 
within the framework of a zero-sum game within a distinct institutional setting.  It 
notes the constraints on domestic adaptation in the pensions sector.  Section 3 places 
the sequence of reform initiatives to date in the context of this framework.  Section 4 
seeks to connect the specifics of the policy process to wider features of Greek society 
in order to deepen the account.  The conclusion clarifies why, despite both EU and 
domestic stimuli, the attempts at pension reform in Greece have enjoyed only modest 
success.  
 
The policy problem 
 
In many respects the pension ‘problem’ in Greece is similar to that found elsewhere 
and the relevance of the EU also stands comparison.  What is exceptional in the Greek 
case is the particular institutional configuration for policy delivery and the constraints 
associated with reform.  The latter will be discussed later. 
 
The domestic stimulus to reform 
 Ultimately, the domestic stimulus to pension reform is to be seen in the 
context of the ‘modernization’ project promoted by Costas Simitis, prime minister 
since 1996.  As leader of a faction within PASOK – the governing socialist party – 
Simitis sought fiscal discipline, social democratic public goods, and liberal political 
reforms.  Pension reform could be seen as being affected by each such goal: gross 
public debts and deficits (partly as a result of the high costs of pension provision) 
threatened Greece’s role in the EU; current pension provision showed major 
bureaucratic inefficiencies; and inequalities in pension benefits and coverage 
contradicted left of centre values.  In short, ‘modernization’ required substantial 
pension reform. 
 
 In fact, the identification of the policy problem has remained remarkably 
consistent over successive Greek governments (Featherstone and Tinios, 
forthcoming).  Demographic changes – an ageing population – and shifts in social 
practices – with more women seeking employment – are common to Greece and other 
Western societies.  The general policy model follows that of the Mediterranean 
welfare state (Ferrera, 1996) and should be seen in the context of other flanking 
policies (Matsaganis et al, 2003).  The system is fragmented, and lacks a unitary 
philosophy or common effective operational rules.  Katrougalos and Lazaridis (2003) 
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distinguish the systems of Greece and Italy from those of Spain and Portugal: the 
former are more fragmented in structure and more costly as a percentage of GDP.  
They contest, however, the notion that in general the systems of all four states are 
more generous than those found elsewhere in the EU.   
 
The more specific features of the Greek system are threefold (Featherstone and 
Tinios, forthcoming): 
  
• The costs of provision have escalated, whilst an increasing revenue burden 
has been passed to future generations, in a system with a weak budget 
constraint. 
 
The pension system in Greece is overwhelmingly dominated by public provision.  
The system operates on the basis of ‘Pay-as-you-go’ (PAYG) provision.  Such 
systems rely on inter-generational solidarity (one generation paying for another), 
but also risk an ill-defined and weak budget constraint as costs are deferred to 
future years.  The incentive to political leaders to ‘pass the buck’ to future 
generations of workers has proved too tempting. These features are system-
related, rather than nationally specific.  The current level of expenditure on 
pensions in Greece, however, is equivalent to 12.1% of her GDP, above the EU 
average of 10.5% (O’Donnell and Tinios, 2003).  Some 3% of GDP is spent 
annually on supplementing the statutory revenue of the pension system (Greek 
Report on Pensions Strategy, 2002).  This represents a fiscal burden that is 
increasingly seen as unsustainable.  The cost of reform inaction remains difficult 
to communicate.  Fiscal apocalypse is rarely imminent, projections seem 
technically opaque, and existing privileges are repeatedly seen as threatened.  The 
ultimate budget constraint is that of the Government itself. 
 Moreover, severe management problems remain.  Remarkably, key actuarial 
work to gauge future revenue had to put out to international tender in 2000 and 
was won by the UK Government Actuaries1. 
 
• The extreme institutional fragmentation of policy delivery. 
 
Pension provision in Greece varies by occupation or profession.  The institutional 
organization for delivery shows extreme fragmentation. The most common 
method of organization is pension funds, the largest of which are IKA (Idrima 
Kinonikon Asfaliseon, Social Insurance Foundation, for the private sector), 
insuring about 70% of Greek workers, and OGA (Organismos Georgikon 
Asfaliseon, Agricultural Insurance Organization).  Civil servants’ (primary) 
pensions are paid directly from the government budget, without the intermediary 
of a fund (O’Donnell and Tinios, 2003).  A recent estimate put the total number of 
the funds at 236 (O’Donnell and Tinios, 2003), though there has been much de 
facto concentration and the most recent legislation (the ‘Reppas reform’) aims to 
reduce the number drastically.  The institutional structure creates gross 
inefficiencies and has facilitated buck passing between social groups, as well as 
between generations.  
 
• The inequities of benefits and coverage. 
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In parallel to this institutional fragmentation, the system shows much disparity of 
level of benefit and coverage of population.  Traditionally, privileges were granted 
to particular sectors, not least the liberal professions and public employees.  
Latterly, the privileged have fiercely defended their existing benefits, seemingly 
immune to wider social interests: a clash of micro-interests against macro-needs. 
 In important ways, the system structures perceptions (O’Donnell and Tinios, 
2003), with one group contrasting its position with that of another.  There is a 
major lack of public understanding of how this highly fragmented system works 
and (technically opaque) reform attempts provoke fears over the loss of privileges.  
With the relationship between contributions and benefits a weak one, the impetus 
is to seek further general public subsidy for existing privileges.  Failure to do so is 
seen as a government reneging on promises, weakening civic trust. 
 
These three features are crucial to an understanding of the structure of power and 
interests affecting policy provision and reform attempts in the pensions sector.  The 
systemic implications will be discussed below in Section 2.   
 
The EU stimulus to reform 
 The domestic stimuli to reform, however, exist in parallel to those emanating 
from the EU level.  The first such pressure related to the fiscal constraints affecting 
government budgets in the run-up to entry into the euro, single currency system.  The 
Maastricht Treaty provisions on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) set clear 
fiscal rules for euro entry.  Member states should have a budget deficit equivalent to 
no more than 3% of their GDP and debt levels no greater than 60% of GDP.  Whilst 
the decisions on euro entry made at the Brussels European Council in May 1998 
displayed much flexibility of interpretation on the public debt rule, the 3% limit was 
adhered to more strictly and was replicated in the Stability and Growth Pact adopted 
at the Amsterdam summit in June 1997.  These rules posed major problems for 
Greece.  Government borrowing had reached 19% of GDP in 1990, with pensions 
payments alone accounting for 15% of GDP (Featherstone et al, 2001).  Deficits 
remained high - 13.4% in 1993, 10.2% in 1995 – until they reached 2.5% in 1998 
when the euro decision was due (Eurostat, 2003).  Debt levels proved more 
intractable: 110.1% of GDP in 1993, 105.8 in 1998 and not falling below 105% until 
2002 (Eurostat, 2003).  Successive Greek governments – under Mitsotakis, 
Papandreou and Simitis – affirmed their commitment to reforming public finances in 
order to gain entry to the euro system.  Indeed, during the EU-level negotiations on 
Greece’s entry into the euro, pressure was placed on the Simitis Government – 
notably by the Germans - to make more substantive progress on pension reform as a 
specific means of promoting Greece’s convergence2.  Such a direct focus must have 
strengthened the understanding of the relevance of reform to Greece’s European 
credibility.  To Simitis, in particular, modernization is synonymous with Greece being 
a full member of the EU and failure to join the single currency would have risked 
huge costs of marginalization. 
 
 Following closely on the heels of EMU as a test of EU membership came the 
latter’s move into the area of structural economic reform and a shift to ‘soft’ law as a 
decision-making style.  The EU agenda on structural economic reform has developed 
apace in recent years. The EU became very concerned by the late 1980s about the 
need for Europe to become more competitive in the international economy.  These 
concerns were taken up by the Delors’ White Paper on ‘Competitiveness, Growth and 
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Employment’ in 1993.  A change of approach resulted in the establishment of the 
‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) operating on the basis of benchmarking, 
‘multilateral surveillance’ and sharing of best practice.   The EU ‘push’ on structural 
reform was taken further at the European Councils held in Luxembourg (1997), 
Cardiff (1998), and Koln (1999).  At Helsinki in December 1999, the European 
Council established a process to review progress on structural reform across all 
member states.  In 2000, the so-called ‘Lisbon process’ was launched, following a 
European Council agreement.  OMC-style coordination now covers various economic 
policies (Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, BEPG); labour markets (European 
Employment Strategy); and, welfare reform (Open Method on Social Inclusion and on 
Pensions) (Schelkle, 2003).  EU action on Employment and Social Policy (ESP) 
covers social protection, social integration and pensions.  The ‘Social Protection 
Committee’, composed of representatives of national governments, focuses on 
national pension strategies, reviewing their adequacy and their adaptation to a 
changing society.  The Committee develops benchmarks and receives progress reports 
on pension reform from each member state.  The Council of Ministers, aided by the 
Committee, and the Commission then prepare joint reports on pension reform.   
 
 The effect of the EMU entry criteria and the OMC policy focus has been to 
create a common external stimulus to pension reform in cases like Greece where the 
fiscal burden has escalated and there were already concerns about the social equity of 
the system.  Even without the EU constraint, pension reform would have been part of 
the domestic agenda of modernization.  But EU actions offered an additional resource 
to those domestic actors seeking reform. 
  
 
Policy Process 
 
How can the policy process of pension reform in Greece be conceptualised?  The 
complexity of the process, displaying an array of features relevant to both the sector 
and its wider social context, suggests the relevance of a variety of different 
approaches.  But, the prime features appear to be: 
 
• Given the resistance to increasing the demands on state revenues in this area – 
via increased expenditure, taxation or contributions - the policy outcomes of 
reform are likely to be zero-sum; that is, the material benefits would be 
unevenly distributed between pension recipients. The pie cannot be bigger, so 
the slicing becomes more problematic. 
• As a result, the incentives to cooperate in the reform process differ between 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and the political strength of the former is crucial to the 
success or failure of the reform initiative. 
• The key actors determining the outcome are the government and the unions, 
with the employers playing a lesser role, and the interests and strategies of 
these actors are crucial. 
With these features in mind, the core elements of the policy process can be placed 
within the framework of a zero-sum game.  Yet, it is a game in which actor strategies 
are set within a distinct institutional setting (Shepsle, 1989; Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Scharpf, 1997).  A rational choice aspect is relevant in identifying a select number of 
actors, exercising a significant degree of operational autonomy in the application of 
general priorities and in the choice of strategy.  The actors display a rationality in the 
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consistency of their beliefs and preferences; in the correspondence of their beliefs and 
behaviour; and in their choice of strategy.  Yet, a crucial element in this perspective is 
the constraining effects of the institutional setting in which the actors operate.  
Consistent with rational choice institutionalism, ‘institutions’ here should be 
interpreted in a very broad sense, incorporating the structure of beliefs, norms, rules, 
etc. 
 
The institutional setting is marked by the weakness of state actors as agents of 
reform.  The weakness of the Greek state defines the overall context of policy-making 
in Greece.  Traditionally, it has been seen as ‘a colossus with feet of clay’, to use the 
description used by Nicos Mouzelis (1990) and taken up by Dimitris Sotiropoulos 
(1993).  To many, this has been a colossus with an inelegant form, however: huge, ill-
coordinated and dysfunctional.  It has feet of clay because of its own institutional 
weakness; whilst it is imbalanced because of the weakness of civil society and its easy 
penetration by party interests. As Calliope Spanou (1996) put it, the Greek state has 
been ‘hypertrophied, omnipresent, but ultimately weak’.  The capability of 
government to introduce major structural reform – liberalizing the state’s economic 
regulation, ownership and social support – has been shown by recent experience to be 
severely limited.  The reputation of the Greek state in the modern period has been 
low.  Today, the state’s administrative complex is seen as suffering from internal 
problems of poor coordination; excessive legalism and hierarchical control; turf-
fighting; the paucity of high quality technical personnel; the inefficient use, and often 
the lack of, resources; clientelism and non-meritocratic norms; party infiltration; and, 
the lack of permanency for senior positions.  These features appear endemic to the 
administration, sustained across different governments.  High expectations of 
administrative reform have been repeatedly dashed – as in 1981 and 1991 – as the 
task proves beyond the will and capability of elected politicians.  The effect is also 
that parties with radical reform objectives come into power faced with a weak agency 
to engineer policy change.   
 
The weakness of state actors as agents of reform is further evident from their 
relations with other social actors.  Public choice theory is relevant here in its depiction 
of a weak state hindered by rent-seeking behaviour (Krueger, 1974).  Thus, sectional 
interests compete for favours, resources and subsidies.  Rational choice models 
distinguish between zero-sum competition and games where ‘win-win’ solutions are 
available. In the case of Greek pensions, those groups that have accumulated 
significant privileges have found reform threatening: a redistribution of resources to 
address social inequities would lead them worse off.  No matter that in the long-term 
the system might collapse: many current workers have short-term interests. The 
incentive to cooperate with the reform process is minimal. 
 
There is also a systemic problem in the representation of interests.  The major 
unions are dominated by leaders of those groups with the highest relative rights and 
privileges. On the union side, GSEE is controlled by the unions of the public utilities 
(e.g. DEH, the power corporation; OTE, the now partially-privatised 
telecommunications corporation; and the unions of the banking sector, OTOE).  
Alongside them is ADEDY (Higher Level of Public Servants’ Unions). Amongst 
both, many of the workers have relatively secure employment and generous pension 
arrangements.  Similarly, business representation is skewed towards those firms with 
an interest in the maintenance of the status quo: large, unionised entreprises serving 
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mainly the domestic market, rather than the smaller and medium sized firms with an 
interest in greater flexibility and lower labour costs.  For the larger corporations, the 
peace of the status quo is preferred to the risks of seeking gains from reform, 
especially if these might entail additional costs.  Corporatism in Greece has a tradition 
of being both disjointed and distorted, with the interests of firms and workers in other 
sectors being squeezed out (Mavrogordatos, 1988; Lavdas, 1997).  The consequence 
is that very strong forces exist to defend the accumulated privileges and inequalities, 
with the beneficiaries seeing reform issues in a zero-sum manner. 
 
 The problems of agency are compounded by the inherent difficulties of the 
reform agenda.  The rational self-interests of the major actors weigh against serious 
reform. It is not clear who really wants change.  The political cost of reform failure 
for the government is high and immediate, in terms of credibility, trust and reputation.  
The direct gains from pension reform for government – notably a reduced fiscal 
burden – are largely obtainable in the long-term.  An expansion and a greater equality 
of provision imposes short-term financial costs, while appealing to a politically weak 
social constituency.  The future generation of workers constitutes a third player in the 
game, but one absent from the table.  Tinios (2002) sees the future generation as the 
losers, whilst today’s workers and retired can engage in a positive-sum game at its 
expense.  For any individual group of workers it is worth holding out and protecting 
their accumulated privileges, whatever anyone else might do. There is also a 
communication problem: system fragmentation often requires mutually contradictory 
messages to be transmitted to different social groups (Featherstone and Tinios, 
forthcoming).  This is exacerbated by the inevitable complexity for the different social 
groups of the actuarial projections: trying to identify the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. 
 
 The above suggests a strong combination of interests defending status quo 
privileges and rights.  Thus, the reform process can be seen as a zero-sum game 
between the current winners and losers.  Reform involving an expansion to include 
the currently marginalized and/or to reduce the overall fiscal burden involves gains 
and losses to the players.  Two impediments can be identified here.  Firstly, the gains 
from the status quo are concentrated in effective pressure groups (the major Greek 
unions identified above), while the losses are diffuse amongst the weak.  Reform is 
thus blocked by a difference of organizational strength and resources.  Alesina and 
Drazen refer to a “war of attrition between different socio-economic groups with 
conflicting distributional objectives” (1991:1171).  But a second impediment has also 
been identified above: the uncertainty and lack of understanding as to the outcomes of 
the successive reforms that have been proposed.  Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) 
showed how, with (even) uncertainty amongst the players over the distribution of 
gains and losses from reform, policies that are in the general public interest can 
remain elusive.  Instead, there is a bias towards the status quo and away from policies 
that are, in objective terms, ‘efficiency-enhancing’.  This outcome holds even if actors 
possess other qualities:  being risk-neutral, forward-looking, and rational. 
 
 Such interpretations pose alternative strategies for reform-minded 
governments.  With entrenched and concentrated interests the task is to overcome 
them by scoring a political victory.  With uncertainty over outcomes, the task is to 
educate and build-up trust.  This might be applied to contrast the pension reform 
initiatives of Manos/Sioufas (1992) and Yiannitsis (2001) with those of Reppas 
(2002). 
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Policy Performance 
 
What pension reforms have been achieved in Greece?  It is significant that the need 
for pension reform was recognised by the second half of the 1980s, in the context of 
the policy shift towards economic ‘stabilisation’.  This shift, and its general discourse, 
was closely associated with Costas Simitis, then Minister of National Economy and 
now Prime Minister.  A domestic momentum had been started.  However, it faltered 
as pension-funding deficits were covered on grounds of political expediency and 
tentative reform initiatives were aborted. 
 
 Thus, it is even more relevant to note that the first serious moves for reform 
came in 1990-92 when Greek public finances were in deep crisis and the EMU tests 
were being established.  Fiscal laxity imperilled Greece’s European membership.  The 
New Democracy Government of Constantinos Mitsotakis, elected in April 1990, 
sought swift legislation to tackle the most urgent problems of pension financing3.  It is 
indicative of the fiscal imperative that the reform was handled by the new Minister of 
National Economy, Georgios Souflias.  Law 1902/90 was passed rapidly, introducing 
spending cuts and gradual increases in contributions.  Even these short term measures 
had been affected by intense union opposition and some funds were excluded from 
the reforms.  The Souflias Law, as it became known, lacked a long term perspective 
and it did not tackle the structural deficiencies of the system.  A more radical shake-
up was promised before the end of the Government’s term of office. 
 
 The reform task was taken up by Stefanos Manos, a later successor of Souflias 
as Minister of National Economy.  When Manos was appointed, in February 1992, the 
record of the Mitsotakis Government was undermined by disappointing economic 
indicators – well short of its own 1991 Stabilization Programme – and leaving Greece 
vulnerable to international criticism.  Manos, a neo-liberal, established a broadly-
based committee under Professor Rossetos Fakiolas to prepare radical pension 
proposals.  The work of the committee was soon discredited, however.  Its report 
seemed too hastily prepared, yet too cautious in content.  The union representatives 
walked out of the committee, accusing the Government of using it as a smokescreen 
for a different economic agenda.  In fact, Manos had indeed commissioned another 
report on pension reform from the IMF.  The Minister leaked the report to the press, 
himself, in an apparent attempt to warn the unions of the dire projections.  The 
summer of 1992 saw widespread union protests and strikes.  The Government, 
possessing a slim parliamentary majority, was also threatened by attacks on its 
pension plans from some of its own supporters, including the then Governor of the 
Bank of Greece, Efthimnios Christodolou. 
 
 The law initiated by Manos (2084/92) represented a substantial dilution of the 
original radical zeal.  More radical changes were not feasible given the domestic 
opposition.  Some major steps were taken: an increase in the retirement age for both 
men and women; an increase in National Insurance contributions; and a reduction in 
the ceiling of the pension/exit salary ratio from 80 to 60%.  Nevertheless, the major 
structural deficiencies were left untouched: the fragmentation of the system and the 
gross inequalities of provision.  The privileges of the strongest sectoral interests – the 
power corporation (DEH), the state banks and the professions - remained unscathed.  
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Yet, the Manos law had put back the crisis: providing ‘room to breathe’ fiscally until 
2010.  In actuarial terms, this was a relatively short window. 
 
 After the electoral defeat of the Mitsotakis Government in 1993, the return of 
Andreas Papandreou as prime minister witnessed the effective removal of pension 
reform from the government agenda.  A sense of stagnation was ended with his 
retirement on health grounds and his replacement by the arch-modernizer Costas 
Simitis.  After his own political position had been strengthened following the 
elections of October 1996, Simitis established the ‘Committee for the Study of Long 
Term Economic Policy’ to assist with Greece’s EMU convergence.  The Committee 
was headed by Yiannis Spraos, Emeritus Professor of the University of London, and 
was known by his name.  The Committee produced seven reports in total, but that on 
social security and pension reform received the greatest attention. 
 
 The Spraos Report on pensions was leaked to the press in September 1997 and 
published officially the following month.  The Report attempted to identify the 
problems requiring action and to outline options.  Yet, the press leaks – not without 
some justification – presented the Report as advocating major cuts in existing pension 
rights and benefits.  The Report rejected a continuation of the practice of reform ‘by 
instalments’, and though it did not promote any single policy model it did elaborate 
thirty areas requiring action.  The Report provoked fierce opposition from unions 
defending accumulated privileges and from the Left.  New Democracy refused to take 
a position, though the employers’ federation SEB and the former Minister Souflias 
did support the Report.  Even Simitis’ own spokesmen quickly distanced the 
government from the Report.  The Report had been savaged by vested interests and 
there was no political voice strong enough that was prepared to defend it.  Notably, 
despite the fact that the Report reiterated much of what had been said in previous 
reports - from the IMF, OECD and domestic committees – there was no technocratic 
‘policy community’ in Greece willing and able to endorse it.  This point will be taken 
up later. 
 
 Pension reform was clearly a potato too hot to handle, politically. Yet, Simitis 
implicitly recognized that it was a problem that required action if ‘modernization’ was 
to be advanced.  In the April 2000 election, PASOK was the only party to explicitly 
commit itself to pension reform.  Simitis had identified pensions as a target so often, 
his credibility was at stake.  The ‘poisoned chalice’ of seeking reform was passed to 
another economist and ally of Simitis, Tassos Yiannitsis, when he was appointed as 
Minister of Labour.  His proposals, published in April 2001, soon came to be seen as 
far too challenging to the strongest groups of workers and the Government withdrew 
them.  The package had sought to enhance the fiscal viability of the system and to 
make it considerably more equitable (Matsaganis, 2002a).  The retirement age was to 
be raised; the required insurance period for a seniority pension increased; the 
replacement rate reduced to 60% of reference earnings; the minimum pension raised 
but means-tested; and the lower retirement age for mothers of younger children 
replaced.  The Government estimated that the cumulative pensions deficit would be 
reduced over 50 years by 17.5% (to €290billion).  The reaction was devastating: 
government ministers, previously briefed and acquiescent, disowned the proposals 
advanced by their colleague, whilst the largest trade union confederation, GSEE – 
with a disproportionate representation of those with the greatest public sector pension 
privileges – called a general strike (Matsaganis, 2002a).  In the face of the storm, the 
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Simitis Government rescinded the proposals and called for a renewed social dialogue 
about such matters.  An extraordinary party congress held by PASOK, focussed 
essentially on the issue of pension reform, kept the commitment to reform. 
 
 But with fingers having been burnt, the new impetus was for consensus and 
more sensitive presentation.  Social dialogue has had a highly chequered history in 
Greece and has rarely been the basis for substantive policy formulation (Featherstone 
and Papadimitriou, 2003).  Yiannitsis’ successor, Dimitris Reppas, presented a new 
set of proposals in March 2002.  His approach was to show a willingness to spend 
even more money on pensions, prior to reform, in order to build up trust amongst the 
key interests (Featherstone and Tinios, forthcoming).  This was a significant shift of 
strategy: attacked as timid, but defended as sensitive to the realities of the policy 
process.  Either way, it sacrificed many of the more radical objectives advanced 
previously by Manos, Spraos and Yiannitsis.   
 
Reppas’ package was complex (Matsaganis, 2002b).  Its provisions 
distinguished between groups of employees according to when they first entered the 
labour market: firstly, those first employed since the start of 1993 and, secondly,  
those employed between 1983 and 1992.  Both elements concerned those under IKA, 
the main pension fund, and those with the funds for banks, the civil service, and state 
enterprises.  Those employed in the most recent period would have higher minimum 
pensions after 35 years of service (up from 60 to 70% of the minimum wage, whilst 
for the older group the minimum pension would be gradually reduced from 80 to 70% 
after 37 years of service (Kathimerini, 22.3.02). The period for reference earnings was 
to be extended.  No extension was to be made to the retirement age: in fact, some 
would be able to retire earlier.  An important actuarial dimension was the injection of 
€1.3billion by the Government into IKA to sustain its finances.  Indeed, other funds 
were expected (first, compulsorily then voluntarily after opposition) to join IKA.  
National Economy Minister, Nikos Christodoulakis, now projected that the pensions 
deficit would range between 3.5 and 7% of GDP over thirty years.  This was 
substantially more optimistic than the forecast of 11.1% forseen by UK Government 
Actuaries Department in a report for Yiannitsis just one year earlier.  To his critics, 
Christodoulakis was engaging in ‘creative accounting’, with deficits deferred and 
hidden.  The proposals were to begin in 2008 after a five year transition period and, 
according to Reppas, would secure a viable system until 2030. 
 
The response to Reppas’ proposals was somewhat disparate and muted.  
Critics seemed unsure as to the basis for their attack: too generous, too little funding 
offered, or too timid (Kathimerini, 22.3.02).  New Democracy’s Georgios Souflias 
saw the Government as not being serious about reform.  On the other hand, GSEE and 
ADEDY (the civil servants’ union) called a general strike.  But, in general their attack 
seemed half-hearted.  After the more radical proposals of Yiannitsis one year earlier, 
based on dire government forecasts, those of Reppas seemed heavily sweetened.  An 
amended version of Reppas’ proposals was passed by Parliament on 20 June 2002.  
 
The new ‘softly, softly’ approach had tinkered with the system and obscured 
the price, but some kind of endpoint had been reached in the reform process.  After 
more than a decade of reform attempts, the key features of the policy problem remain: 
not overcome, but modestly abated.  The fiscal burden is projected to increase, major 
social inequities remain, and the institutional structure continues to be fragmented.   
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A wider perspective 
 
The record of pension reform in Greece clearly attests to the importance of non-
cooperation amongst the key actors as a result of perceptions of zero-sum benefits.  
For their part, successive governments have displayed uncertain will and divided 
purpose.  The commitment to reform has been undermined by discordant voices 
between ministers, making different political calculations.  The benefits to any 
particular government of a successful reform are modest – to be passed on to their 
successors in the long-term – whilst the risk of an immediate political backlash is 
severe.  The strongest union voices are those seeking to defend the current privileges, 
with their interests defined strictly in the short-term.  By contrast, the social 
representation of those likely to benefit from reform is distorted and weak.  Added to 
this, the content and implications of reform are very difficult to ‘sell’ to the mass 
public. 
  
The dilemmas faced by reformers must be placed in a wider context, however, 
in order to better account for the social structuring of the process.  The most 
immediate feature concerns how technical expertise enters the policy process.  In this 
case, the technocratic input into the reform process was both narrow and shallow, 
offering weak legitimisation of the reform agenda set by ministers.  
 
The input of expertise came from personal advisers, with little emanating from 
within the state bureaucracy itself.  No effective community of policy expertise on 
pension reform was established in Greece: no group, network or institution 
independent of party or government had identified itself or developed a political 
voice.  Nothing of significance appeared in wider society to be directed independently 
at public education.   
 
This is symptomatic of the rarity of effective, independent policy think-tanks 
in Greece.  Few such bodies have been created and sustained as effective institutional 
actors.  The term is used loosely across cultures (Stone et al, 2003).  ‘Independence’ 
might refer to autonomy over setting the research agenda and/or to sources of funding 
and/or to distance from one political party or interest.  ‘Policy’ denotes a primary 
function of contributing technical knowledge to public debate on available options.  
By such measures, there are few such think-tanks in Greece.  An exception is 
ELIAMEP (Elliniko Idryma Europaikis and Eksoterikis Politikis / The Hellenic 
Foundation for European and Foreign Policy), sustained by an informed academic 
community.  There are several bodies in Greece functioning as research institutes.  
Notable examples are EKKE (Ethniko Kendro Ereunon / National Centre for Social 
Research) and KEPE (Kendro Programmatismou kai Oikonomikon Ereunon/ Centre 
of Planning and Economic Research).  These have a different academic focus and 
remit, however: they do not have a primary role of producing public policy analysis.  
A number of political centres, foundations or committees identify themselves as 
‘think-tanks’, but they lack independence and longevity, whilst their policy research 
function is often limited.  They serve more as fora for debate amongst like-minded 
politicians and intellectuals, appendages to particular party factions.  Their output is 
more likely to be reflective commentaries and essays, than professional policy 
analysis.  Examples here are OPEK (Omilos Provlimatismou yia ton Eksigxronismo 
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tis Koinonias mas / Forum for the Modernisation of Greek Society), promoting 
Simitis’ social democratic ‘modernization’ agenda, and KPEE (Kendro Politikis 
Epevnas Epikoinonias / Centre for Political Research and Communication) advancing 
a neo-liberal agenda and, notably, in the late 1980s supporting Constantine 
Mitsotakis. 
 
In these respects, the latter can be compared with many similar bodies found 
elsewhere in southern Europe.  However, Italy, for example, has in recent years seen a 
growth of think-tanks specialising in professional tasks such as policy evaluation and 
impact assessment (Lucarelli and Radaelli, 2003).  Whilst the Tesoro made extensive 
use of external social science research on pensions, the Foreign Ministry has remained 
more closed to academic policy input.  Something like the reverse appears to be the 
case in Greece. 
 
The absence of policy research institutes in Greece in the domestic field is the 
result, no doubt, of a combination of factors.  Limitations of resources and funding are 
evident.  Potential donors may prefer to seek benefits from the state or political 
parties, if not giving to charity.  Cultural factors are relevant here: the relative absence 
of a tradition of ‘independence’ across different sectors of civil society.  Politicians 
and parties have been loath to accept the autonomy that professional public policy 
think tanks require.  In parallel to this, the career-paths of the brightest technocrats 
with policy interests often veer directly towards the state or a party.  Academically, 
the study of public policy in Greece is, in relative terms, still in its infancy with 
limited specialist personnel.  Policy evaluation and impact analysis are rare and more 
likely to be prompted by international bodies.  Moreover, such research normally rests 
on detailed empirical investigation, often by teams of researchers, which again is not 
often found in this area in Greece. 
 
The consequence of these conditions for the case of pension reform is that 
initiatives were dependent on the political standing of the minister.  This is a 
reaffirmation of the relevance of personality politics to the reform process: a feature 
noted by Pagoulatos in relation to Greek privatisation (Pagoulatos, 2001).  Individual 
ministers were left to stand like General Custer against fierce foes, charged with 
finding a political way out.  Few others in the state machine had a stake in the reform 
initiative or became engaged in public education on the matter.  Ministers were faced 
with developing a strategy for multi-dimensional chess, circumventing entrenched 
veto-points.  The ‘stop-go’ nature of the reform momentum and the inconsistency in 
ambition suggests an uncertainty of political will between successive ministers and 
governmental heads. 
  
Broadening the analytical perspective further, the reform process might also 
be related to the nature of ‘social capital’ in Greece (Putnam, 1993; Vazquez, 2000).  
The relevance of social capital is to be seen in the negative: that is, to explain the low 
level of trust in government reform initiatives (Featherstone and Tinios, forthcoming).  
The rational choice and social capital perspectives are seemingly different sets of 
explanation: one concerned with instantaneous rationality, the other with long-term 
evolution of settings.  For the former, the rationality of union actors, defending 
accumulated privileges, is set by short-term gains on zero-sum assumptions.  Yet, 
‘trust’ affects the calculation of interests and social capital should not be seen as 
static: it can be affected by government action   Pension reform has suffered from 
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some of the weaknesses and suspicions inherent in the wider Greek ‘social dialogue’ 
(Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2003).  Moreover, reform initiatives have entailed 
some reforms dated in the long-term, seeking to avoid a system collapse of 
disadvantage to all.  Such initiatives have been undermined by an absence of trust in 
the motivations and purposes of government.    The process itself has engendered 
distrust.  The recourse to reform by instalments has served to heighten suspicions and 
increase timidity.  Further, low levels of trust limit the will to negotiate packages 
across policy items.  
 
 The dilemmas of the wider structural reform process display some shared 
characteristics.  Lyberaki and Tsakalotos (2002) examined the problems faced by 
PASOK’s post-1981 project of ‘socializing’ public enterprises.  The failures, they 
note, were due to the fact that vertical linkages limited the knowledge, resources and 
social capital on which to build.  The emphasis on the ‘top-down’ control and the 
weakness of the social base seemed to go to the heart of the early PASOK project.  
Ultimately, “mutual suspicion between the groups, and between such groups and the 
government – whose inclination, let alone ability, to enter into long-term credible 
commitments was, somewhat justifiably, always in doubt – made the focus on short-
term gains the dominant strategy, fatally weakening the policy…even before it got off 
the ground” (2002:104).  PASOK, they argue has had more success in macro- than 
micro-economic policy, because the former is less dependent on the social 
environment.  Yet, they comment that the Mitsotakis Government’s privatisation 
programme also came unstuck because of “the difficulty of reform when trust, 
cooperation and initiative are at such a premium” (2002:107).  Reform projects of 
different ideological approaches require relevant, though distinct, social conditions 
and in the Greek case the absence of trust and cooperation has thwarted consensus and 
implementation.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 This paper has argued that the pressures for pension reform have not been 
sufficient to overcome the weakness in capability to deliver it and it has identified the 
major constraints on reform.  The domestic process is one of near gridlock: 
overcoming this either requires a short-term bloody political battle (the government 
taking on the unions) or a longer-term shift of attitudes and a building up of trust 
(social concertation, acceptance of technocratic case).  The issues starkly pose the 
clash between social democratic modernization and the inertia of vested interests and 
distorted representation.  The outcome questions the ability of the EU to manage a 
process of structural reform across diverse and deeply-rooted institutional settings. 
 
 The stimulus to pension reform in Greece has been evident from both the 
European and the domestic levels.  EMU posed a tight fiscal constraint, squeezing the 
resources for continued state subsidies.  Indeed, Greece’s partners saw her 
convergence as being partially dependent on pension reform.  The instrumentality of 
reform was thus evident.  The OMC coverage of pensions both affects Greece’s 
interest in reform (credibility, reputation), while serving to impact on domestic ideas 
(policy learning, mimickry, benchmarking).  At the same time, the indigenous 
stimulus to reform had a strong, independent force of its own, involving both interests 
(the huge fiscal burden, the distorting impact of fragmentation) and ideas (the 
normative concerns over social justice).   
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 Yet, the reform achievement has been modest and slow.  Initiatives stretched 
over more than twelve years, whilst the costs of the system have not been 
significantly curtailed and there remain major inequities in provision.  The external 
stimulus to reform shifted: EMU required quick budget ‘fixes’ at a general 
macroeconomic level with a temporary urgency.  As Matsaganis (2002:115) has 
recently commented, ‘EMU was a good hand played badly’.  The opportunity was lost 
with the failure of the Spraos initiative.  More generally, the OMC process lacks 
strength to require domestic reform.  The normative EU stimulus has been one of 
reinforcement of ideas, rather than of producing shifts.  
 
 The paper has argued that the domestic policy process has suffered from major 
obstacles.  These obstacles can be seen through the lens of a zero-sum game, with 
actor strategies shaped by the institutional setting.  The interaction between the key 
actors has been marred by: 
 
a) Differential organizational strength and the existence of veto-players on behalf 
of status quo privileges and rights. 
b) Distorted and disjointed representation of relevant social interests amongst 
workers and employers. 
c) The weak technical legitimation of government initiatives as a result of the 
relative absence of a wider policy community and of relevant think-tanks. 
d) The internal inefficiencies of government, isolating reform advocates and 
undermining the capability to produce reform. 
e) The uncertain political will to reform (on the part of government) in a 
personality-dependent process. 
f) The lack of trust and the weakness of social capital underpinning the reform 
process. 
g) The uncertainty over likely reform outcomes amongst key actors and the wider 
public. 
 
To these factors might be added the evident problems in government strategy: the 
inability of government to discredit union opposition; and the inability of government 
to build alliances with the likely ‘winners’ from reform.  Together, these factors 
comprise the structural conditions of the policy process and the dilemmas of agency. 
They are formidable obstacles to the will and capability to produce and implement 
pension reform. 
 
 As such, the paper characterizes key features of public policy-making in 
Greece: the limitations of state authority; the peculiarities of the corporatist system; 
the weakness of technocracy; the cultural constraints affecting the attainment of 
public goods; and the problems in securing trust and commitment.  The factors 
identified above question the nature of authority, legitimacy and participation in the 
system.  They pose major dilemmas for structural economic reforms motivated by 
different ideological perspectives - social democratic or neoliberal – and they are 
unlikely to be overcome within a short-term project.   
 
 Greece is far from being the only laggard in Europe on pension reform.  
Similarly, it is not the only state in which pension reform produces fierce political 
reactions.  Domestic institutional settings vary and the significance of such variation 
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threatens the ability of the EU to lead a process of structural reform with the tools it 
currently possesses.  This national study displays the strength of constraint embedded 
in one test case: a case, however, exhibiting some extreme features. 
 
 
References 
 
 
A. Alesina and A. Drazen (1991), ‘Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?’, The American 
Economic Review, 81, 5, pp. 1170-1188. 
 
Eurostat (2003) Quarterly Accounts: First Quarter 2003 – Expenditure and Output 
approach to GDP – First EUROSTAT estimates; europa.eu.int. Accessed 15.7.03. 
 
K. Featherstone, G. Kazamias and D. Papadimitriou (2001), ‘The Limits of External 
Empowerment: EMU, Technocracy and Reform of the Greek Pension System’, 
Political Studies, 49, 3, pp.462-480. 
 
K. Featherstone and D. Papadimitriou (2003), ‘When do Prisoners Escape? The limits 
of consensus-building and labour market reform in Greece’, Paper presented to 
European Studies Association Convention, Tennessee, USA, March. 
 
K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli, eds. (2003), The Politics of Europeanization; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
K. Featherstone and P. Tinios (forthcoming), ‘Facing up to the Gordian Knot: The 
political economy of pension reform’, in E. Mossialos and M. Pet 
 
R. Fernandez and D. Rodrik (1991), ‘Resistance to Reform : Status Quo Bias in the 
Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty’, The American Economic Review, 81, 5, 
pp. 1146-1155. 
 
M. Ferrera (1996), ‘The “Southern Model” of Welfare in Social Europe’, Journal of 
European Social Policy, 6, 1, pp. 17-37. 
 
P. Hall and C. R. Taylor (1996) ‘Political science and the three new institutionalisms’, 
Political Studies, 45. 
 
A. Hemerijck and M. Ferrera (forthcoming) ‘Welfare reform in the shadow of EMU’, 
in A. Martin and G. Ross, eds., EMU and the European Model of Society; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
G. Katrougalos and G. Lazaridis (2003) Southern European Welfare States: 
Problems, Challenges and Prospects; London: Palgrave. 
 
A. O. Krueger (1974), ’The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’, The 
American Economic Review, 64, 3, pp. 291-303. 
 
K. Lavdas (1997) The Europeanisation of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of 
Integration; London: Macmillan. 
 16
 
S. Lucarelli and C. Radaelli (2003), ‘Italy: Think Tanks and the Political System’, in 
D. Stone, M. Garnett and A. Denham, eds., Think Tanks in Comparative Perspective: 
Insiders or Outsiders?; Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. 
 
A. Lyberaki and E. Tsakalotos (2003), ‘Reforming the Economy without Society: 
Social and Institutional Constraints to Economic Reform  in post-1974 Greece’,  
New Political Economy, 7, 1, pp. 93-114. 
 
M. Matsaganis (2002a), ‘Muddling Through: Trials and Tribulations of Social 
Security in Greece’, manuscript, University of Crete, Department of Economics. 
 
M. Matsaganis (2002b) ‘Yet another piece of pension reform in Greece’, South 
European Society and Politics, 7, 3, pp. 109-122. 
 
M. Matsaganis, M. Ferrera, L. Capucha and L. Moreno (2003), ‘Mending Nets in the 
South : Anti-poverty policies in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, Social Policy and 
Administration, December (forthcoming). 
 
G. Th. Mavrogordatos (1988) Between Pitiokamptis and Procroustis: Professional 
Associations in Today’s Greece, Athens: Odysseas (in Greek).  
 
N. Mouzelis (1990) ‘I Hellada sto Perithorio: Poios Ftaiei?’, To Vima tes Kyriakis, 30 
December. 
 
O. O’Donnell and P. Tinios (2003), ‘The Politics of Pension Reform: Lessons from 
Public Attitudes in Greece’, Political Studies, 51, 2, pp.262-281. 
 
G. Pagoulatos (2001), ‘The Enemy Within: Intragovernmental Politics and 
Organizational Failure in Greek Privatization’, Public Administration, 79, 1, pp. 125-
146. 
 
R. D. Putnam, with Leonardi R. and Nanetti R.Y. (1993) Making Democracy Work: 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
F. W. Scharpf (1997) Games Real Actors Play; Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
W. Schelkle (forthcoming), ‘Understanding New Forms of European Integration: A 
Study in Competing Political Economy Explanations’, in E. Jones and A. Verdun, 
eds., Political Economy Approaches to the Study of European Integration,  
 
K. A. Shepsle (1989) ‘Studying institutions: some lessons from the rational choice 
approach’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1, 2. 
 
D. Sotiropoulos (1993) ‘A Colossus with Feet of Clay: The State in Post-
Authoritarian Greece’, in H. Psomiades and S. B. Thomadakis, eds., Greece, the New 
Europe and the Changing International Order; New York: Pella. 
 
 17
C. Spanou (1996) ‘On the regulatory capacity of the Hellenic state: a tentative 
approach based on a case study’, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 62, 
pp. 219-237. 
 
D. Stone, M. Garnett and A. Denham, eds.(2003), Think Tanks in Comparative 
Perspective: Insiders or Outsiders?; Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. 
 
The Greek Report on Pension Strategy (2002); Ministry of Economy and Finance / 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Athens, September. 
 
P. Tinios (2002), ‘Pensions in Greece: The Economics of the Politics of “Reform by 
Instalments”, Fundacion Ramon Areces Conference: ‘Pensions in Europe’, Madrid, 
15 March. 
 
 F. H. Vazquez F. (2000) ‘Social Capital and Civic Republicanism’, Centro de 
Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales: Instituto Juan March...; Working Paper 
149, March. 
 
 
 
                                                 
Notes: 
 
1 Moves to develop domestic services in this area have been made by the Simitis Government. 
2 Comment made by senior member of Greek Government in personal interview, January 2003. 
3 The following paragraphs draw upon Featherstone et al (2001). 
